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tr e.c.a,~ `n-~-~ l~.~.~..o-~t~Customs union under increasing costs conditions
Ever since Prof. Jacob Viner (1950) published tiis
seminal treatise on customs union thecry, the adequacy of
his concepts has been a matter of controversy and confusion
in the literature. One problem has been 'what Viner really
meant'. This issue seems to have been definitely ~ettled in
an admirable article of Prof. Michaely (1976). Another
question is the appropriateness of the traditional concepts
of customs union theory when one or more simplifying assump-
tions of the standard case are altered. Following Michealy
(1976, pp. 75-59), the standard case is a two good -three
country model, wherein the home country experiences rising
costs and both the prospective partner country and the more
efficient rest of the world have infinitely elastic supply
schedules. Corden has shown, for example, that the assumption
of decreasing costs for both union partners (Corden, 1972)
or the assumption of two importgoods, combined with non-
uniformity of initial tariffs (Corden, 197b), creates the
need for supplementary concepts.
The present note analyses another deviation from the
standard case, the implications of which have been inadequate--
ly dealt with. It is assumed that both partner countries
experience increasing costs while only the rest of the world
has a perfectly elastic supply schedule over the relevant-2-
range. It will be demonstrated, both in Kartial and in
general equilibrium analysis, that the traditional concepts
need to be supplemented. It also follows that, contrary to
the standard model, the partner country's "welfare" may in-
crease or decrease. The final section discusses the implica-
tions of the analysis for the fundamental propo3ition, first
formulated by Cooper a Massel (1965), that "... customs
union theory fails to explain .... why customs unions are
formed" (ibid, p. 74). It will be shown that this proposition
does not always hold.
1. The "welfare" implications of a customs union (CU) are
traditionally iield to consist of three substitution
effects: trade creation, trade div~rsion and a consumption
effect. It is convenient to first define these concept5
within the framework of a partíal eqliilibrium analysis.
Figure la represents the x-market of country A, Fig. lb
that of country B. It is assumed (as usual) that A and B
are the prospective CU-member countries, while the rest
of the world is represented by C. Sa, Sb and Sc are the
x-supply schedules of the countries A, B and C; Scu is
defined as Sa plus B's excess supply for prices above B's
autarky price (p3). Both A and B are x-importers before
they join their commercial policies in the customs union,
A importing AB and B A'B' of x from C. As may observed
from the supply schedules, A is least efficient in x-
production and C is most efficient; in consequence, A's-3-
ex ante tariff is {(pa-pc)~pc}.100~ and L"s tariii is
only { (pb-pC)~Pc}.100'b.
T}ie magnituàe of the t}iree effects will largely be
determined by the height of the common external tariff
(CET). This height is only vaguely circumscribed by GATT's
article 24, section 8, stating that the "general incidence"
of the CET shoulà "not exceed" the incidence of the pre-
viously natioiial tariffs. In the broadest interpretation
this clause implies that the CET m~ist lie between (pl-pc)
and (pb-pc). Four CETs have beefl depicted, resulting in
the prices pl through p4. For all prices below B's
autarky price, A will continue to import from C but now
over a lower tariff (see p4 and p3).
For CETs, resulting in prices higher than p3, B will
start capturing part of the x-import of A: at p2, B's
share is C2L; at pl, C has lost its entire trade with A
to country B (C1F1 - Q'R').
'Phe following substitution effects can now be defined.
The first one is the replacement of domestic production
of ímportgoods by ímports. This is the commonly applied
definition of "trade creation", or, more accurately,
"import creation". Since it originates from one-good
par.tial equilibrium analysis, it might be overlooked t}iat
this replacement of domestic production by imports is
tantamount to a substitution of importgood production by
~-4-
exportgo~d production. Thus, a more gen~-ra1 definition
can be applied: impnr-t ~.rta~-i~,n is a decrease in the share
of domestic importgood production in total domestic pro-
duction in reaction to price changes due to the establish-
ment of the CU. Since Fig. 1 is illustrating a partial
equilibrium analysis, the decrease in the share here takes
the form of an absolute change in the vclume of x-pro-
duction. In Fig. la, .import creation is C1D1, at the price
pl, and can be measurec: by looking to production cuts.
For A, import creation is welfare increasing as it re-
presents a move to a greate.r degree of specialization.
This "welfare" ef.fect is traditionally demonstrated by
netting out changes in producer- and consumersurplusl),
as well as losses in tariff revenue. As is wellknown,
impert creation in A would t;hen be C1D1A. Second, trade
diversion or, more accurately, impnrt diversion is the
replacement of imports from a lowcost source by imports
from a higher cost source. At pl, import diversion in
terms of trade flows is D1E1; in terms of resource costs
it is D1E1KH, the uncompensated part of lost revenue.
Third, the co~isumption e;~ect is the change in the share
of importgood consumption in overall consumptive expend-
iture in reaction to price changes due to the establish-
ment of tlie CU. In analogy with import creation, Fig. 1
will only show absolute changes in tt~e volume of x-con-
1) Tkie diff.iculties and limitations of this tradition can-
not be discussed here. For a clarifying discussion of
consumersurplus, see Mishan, 1977.-S-
sumptic~n (in A, t,t. pl, ttiis is E1F1) . In "welfare" terms,
still at I.1, F~1F1B represenLs the consumption effect for
country A. One may find the overall effect by means of
adding the (positive) import creation, the (negative)
import diversion and the (positive) consumption effect.
Note that it is misleading to approximate the overall "wel-
fare" effect by concentrating on the addition of the effects
measured by volume changes in production and trade flows:
in Fig, la the overall effect c~ieasured in volume changes
of trade flows is approximately zero, whereas the overall
effect in resource costs is strongly negative (because of
a large import diversion).
This analysis, however, ís only complete if country
B has a perfectly elastic supply (the case, Michaely invest-
igates in general equilibrium). With B experiencing rising
costs, the crux ot the CU is to be found irc the fj-m~zi~ket.
Zn the rare cases that both A and B have been assumed to
have rising costs, this crucial difference is not always
appreciated2). Considering the spectrum of possible CETs,
two situations can be distinguished. First, there is a
series of CETs resulting in prices up to p3: they cause
three effects. Import destruction is the replacemer,t of im-
2) In their famous article, for example, Cooper 8~ Massel
(1965) do riot deal with the effects in the B-market at
all. From their footnote 3(ibid., p. 743), it is ap-
parent that they do not realize the proper implications.-6-
ports by domestic production of importgoods. It is the
opposite of import creation3) and is tar~tamount to an
increase in the share of domestic importgood production
in total domestic production. Import destruction is wel-
fare dc:creasing as it lowers the degree of specialization
(of B} . At p3, and in terms of trade flows, it is A'Z';
in "welfare" terms it is A"L'Z. In addition there is the
coneumption effect: at p3, and in terms of trade flows,
it is Z'B; in "welfare" terms it is Z'B'Z. In B the con-
sumption effect is negative as, with rising protection,
the share of importgood consumption will decrease. The
third effect, caused by approaching autarky, is a revenue
Zcsa: at p3 this loss is complete and amounts to
A'B X(pb-pc}. From this analysis it follows, that, up to
p3, the customs union is simply a pure move towards freer
trade for A and a pure move towards autarky for B. None of
the three effects is a consequence of A-B trade in x induc-
ed by the CU.
Second, the set of CETs should be considered that
result in prices from p3 up to pl. Beyond p3, changes in
producersurplus will outweigh clianges in consumersurplus
for country B, so that the significance of consumptive and
productive changes will be reversed. Here, we encounter a
conceptual difficulty. Viner's conceYt-s and the consumption
3) Trur,tan (1975, p. 7) uses "trade erosion" to denote an
increase in the share of domestic importgood production
in total domestic production i.e. "Zmport destruction".-7-
effect can be fruitfully applied to an analysis of the
generation, díversion or suppression of imports, but nbt
to exports. Ln the latter case, production expansion and
consumption contraction of tire exportgoud have a~.relíare
increasing impact. L'xport cr~:ation is an increase of the
share of domestic exportgood productior: in total domestic
production in tlie process of replacir~g C-exports to the
partner. At pl, and in terms of trade flows, it is Z"'R'
(in absolute value, since it is partial analysis here);
in "welfare" terms it is Z"'R'Z. The consumption effect
is exactly the same as before, but its sign is opposite:
the consumption contraction Q'Z "'(in "welfare" terms:
Q'Z "'Z) enables additional exports, implying a net
increase in "welfare" for country B. The overall "welfare"
effect in B(for a price pl) can be found by adding the
(negative) import destruction, the (negative) import-
reducing consumption effect, the (negative) revenue effect,
the (positive) export creation and the (positive) export
increasing consumption effect. In Fig. lb the overall
welfare effect is likely to be negative because of the
large revenue loss, the other effects roughly cancelling
out. The conclusion is, that, when both CU partners have
rising costs, the neglect of the effect in the relatively
éfficient country of the CU is a serious omission. Com-
pared to the constant cost case for the latter country
the effects are not only more complex, but also both
welfare in- and decreasir,g, so that the overall effect-8-
may be either.
2. We are now in a position to set up a gecieral equilibrium
analysís. Of course, the switch From partial to general
equilibrium is not without difficulties. Rather than going
into the intricate issues of the welfare economics involved
(see Mishan, 1977, for example), it will be assumed that
levels of "welfare" can be ranked ordinally with the aid
of a set of conununity indifference curves, unique to every
country, and that the increases or decreases in "welfare"
can be expressed in one good by employing the relevant con-
version price ratios. This assumption provides a reason-
able basis for the comparison between the partial and
general equilibrium analysis.
In Figure 2 the prospective CU partners A and B ex-
periance rising opportunity costs; C is a constant cost
supplier. Before the CU, both A and B import x from C and
export y te C.
In A, P1 is the potential free trade production point, P2
the one when a non-discriminatory tariff is raised and P4
the autarky production location; under free trade, A would
consume at the price P1C1 (not drawn); with the tariff, the
price ratio for A-consumers is pa, and consumption is at
C2. In B P11 is the potential free trade pzoduction point,
P12 the one when a non-discriminatory tariff is raised and
P14 the autarky production location; under free trade Bwould censumc at the price
P11C11 (~~ot drawni~~ 1'iCl'
with the tariff the price ratio for Is-consumers is pb and
consumption is at C12. In analogy with Fig. 1, B's (rela-
tive) tariff-inclusive pr.ice of x is low~r than the one
in A and A's autarky price ratio (touching at P4) is much
hígher than the one for B(at P14).
A CU wittl an intermediate C~'i must imply for A-
consumers a relative decrease in the price of x. A CET has
been adopted that precludes C's access to the CU, so that
within the CU there will be free trade and pcu must touch
the transformation curve. This CET is comparable to the
prohibitive {(pl-pc)~pc}'100~ in Fig. i.. Behind this CET
the relative price of x in B will increase beyond its
autarky price in order to expért to A. Static equilibrium
will be achieved at C3 and C13, resp. The analysis will be
facilitated t]y a more detailed graptiical exposition in the
upper left quadrant (for A) and a separate Figur~ 3(for
B). In country A there will be import creation, irnport di-
version and a consumption effect.. Without ex-ante redis-
tribution of revenue ( RC2, collected ín x), A-consumers
would have been at R on Ii. The consumption effect is
positive and takes the form of an improvement in the intra-
economy price ratio from pa to pcu. The negative imFact of
imporr. ~ti ~~~rr~J i on is evident from a worsening of the extern-
al terms of trade: from any given point of production
(such a~ P2), A has to trade along pcu rather than along
P2CL, the world's price ratio, indicating that A-imports-10-
are now originating fror,i a higher cost source. I,r,port
crvatr',-Yi is positive and consists in the move towards
more y-production, enabling A-consumers to achieve 13.
This self-sufficient CU brings about a welfare deteriora-
tion for country A in going from I2 to I3. In general,
however, the overall effect may be either positive or
negative.
In country B there will be five effects, that are
fully analogous to the oartial equilibrium analysis. A
detailed graphical exposition is given in Figure 3, illus-
trating the relevant portion of the lower left quadrant
of Fig. 2. Without ex-ante redistribution of revenue
(DC12, collected in x) by the government, B-consumers
would have been at D on I1 rather than at C12 on I0. The
CU deprives the B-economy of this redistributive possibi-
lity since revenue will be entirely lost (the first
effect). Analytically, B's move to autarky can be broken
down in two effects. Zmport destructío~i is the substi-
tution of y-production for more x-production (from P12 to
P14) along tlie transformation curve, holding the price
(pb) constant. This leads to consumption at F on the lower
indifference curve I2. Import destruction is necessarily
"welfare" decreasing4j. The ir~port decreas;ng consumption
4) Since the autarky production point (here P14) must be
below DP12 and since pb~~DP12, all points such as F
must be located at lower indifference curves than I1.-11-
eff~cr! consists of the relative price increase of x from
pb to paut.
that will eliminate all imports, while maintain-
ing production at P14. This leads to consumption at P14 on
I3. This consumption effect is necessarily "welfaro" de-
creasing as well, since the pb-line going through P14 will
always touch higher i ndifference curves ( at F) than I3.5)
From autarky B moves to a position, exporting x to A and
importing y from A along p. Analytically two effects lead
cu
to this position. The axport increasin;~ eonst~mption effect
consists of the relative increase in the price of x, lead-
ing to a further contraction of x-consumption and so en-
abling x-exports to A. The price ratio stiifts from p to
aut.
p,leading to consumption at f~ on I,,.i'his consumption eïfect cu .
is necessarily "welfare" increasing. Fin311y, ex~~ort ereat-
tion is the substitution of y-production for more production
of the exportgood ( x) along the transformation curve: from
P14 to P13 measured at the given price pcu. Export creation
is, of course, "welfare" increasing.It leads to consumption
at C13 on IS.
As drawn, thís CU arrangement leads to a"welfare" deteriora-
tion for country B in going from Ip to I5. But in general
the overall effect could be either welfare in- or decreasing.
3. Cooper 8 Massel (1965) have questioned the usefulness of
the above type of analysis as a basis ior rrtionalizing
5) The tariff-inclusive price ratio pb must be flatter
than
Paut. under any non-prohibitive tariff.-12-
customs union. ~~oncentratiny their analysis on the home
country, they conclude "... that a customs union is neces-
saril.y ínferior to an rzppr~priate policy of non-preferential
protection" (ibid., pp. 745-746; italics of C 8 M) so that
CU theory '... fails to explain... why customs unions are
formed" (ibid, p. 747). With the aid of the aforegoing
analysis, however, it can be demonstrated that this propo-
sition daes not always hold, not even ~.:hen all assumptions
of Cooper s~ Massel are adopted6~. This can be done by taking
country B more explicitly into consideration.
In dealing with the question why customs unions are
formed, it is assumed that countries decide to join or to
stay out of a CU on the basis of expected net "welfare"
costs or benefits. Of course, this holds for both A ard B.
Yet, strictly spoken, this innocent !ooking assumption
deprives the standard case of customs union theory (see
Michaely, loc. cit.) of its rationalization, since, under
perfectly elastic supply conditions, B will have no "wel-
fare" incentives to set up a CU with A7). The customs uníon
6) Prof. Sven Arndt (1968) has shown that a variable world
terms of trade "... may produce a net improvement in
welfare over any non-preferential tariff situation".
(ibid., p. 976). Cooper a Massel (op. cit.) assume a
given world terms of trade, however.
7) In partial equilibrium analysis, B's additional product-
ion (for exports) along its constant cost supply schedule
does not geilerate producersurplus; and the consumer--13-
might, only come into beirg if A stands tc, gain and offers
B to share these benefits. But, as implied t,y the Cooper
8~ Massel analysis, A will not do this, since it will choose
for the superior option of an appropriate non-preferential
tariff reduction.
The nature of this analysis changes, however, if B
has increasing cost supply schedules. Now, B's "welfare"
ia affected by a customs union arrangement. As can be seen
in Figure 4, situations can be thought out that would
produce a large net "welfare" gain for B. Before joining
the CU, B imports A'B' of x from C. From this position B
has only two options to increase its "welfare": one is to
eliminate its tariff {(pb-pc)~pc},100g, thereby incurring
a net benefit of (A"EA' t B"FB' ); the other one is to
start a customs union with A, at least if the resulting
export price will be sufficiently high to compensate the
revenue loss A'B'FE, the import destruction and the import
decreasing consumption effect by a relatively large export
creation and export increasing consumption effect. As
drawn, B will be indifferent as between the two options
at a cus toms union prí4e p2: since Q' F.' Z- A"B"Z , tre
(continuation of note 7)
surplus ir~ B remains unchanged upon extra production for
A-consumers. Ir~ general equilibrium B's consumption point
(and so its "welfare" level) will remain the same, although
B's production will move from autarky to specialization in
its potential importgood in order to expor.t it to A:-ia-
net "welfare" crain will be exactly equal for buth alterna-
tives (to A" EA t B"F'B). For all higher CU-prices B will
enjoy an extra "welfare" gain over and above the gains
associate~ with the free trade option. If conditions in A
are such tliat prices comparable to pI can be achieved,
situations can be conceived, in principle, in which B is
capable to offer a full comperisation of the revenue loss
in A, following from the customs union8), and ~ontinues
to be better off thar: uncier the free trade option and much
better than before the union. In thosa situations the Coo-
per E Massel proposition no lorcyer hoLds: assuming appro-
priate compensation, A can be lured into a CU arr~ngement
witiiout foregoing a superior option. Cooper 8~ Massel seem
to have overlooked this possibility,because, similar to
many others, they neglect to specify the "welfare" incent-
ives of the prospective partner B.
It follows that the pure theory of customs union is
capable of generating a"case for the customs union". When
basing decision making on "welfare" considerations, a
customs union between A and B can be rationalized if both
countries have increasing costs and ttie ex post customs
union price is sufficiently high for B to compensate A's
revenue loss, making the latter country indifferent as
8) In the Cooper 8~ Massel analysis the preferential and
non-preferential option differ by, what they call "pure
trade diversion". For a self-sufficier~t CU this is simply
equivalent to the loss cf ex-ar.te revenue.-15-
between the prf-ferential and the non-preferential tariff
option.-16-
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